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Resume
This article analyses three methods of remote voting in an uncontrolled environment: postal voting, 
internet  voting  and  hybrid  voting.  It  breaks  down the  voting  process  into  different  stages  and 
compares their vulnerabilities considering criteria that must be respected in any democratic vote: 
confidentiality,  anonymity,  transparency,  vote  unicity  and  authenticity.  Whether  for  safety  or 
reliability,  each  vulnerability is  quantified  by three  parameters:  size,  visibility and difficulty to 
achieve.  The  study  concludes  that  the  automatisation  of  treatments  combined  with  the 
dematerialisation of the objects used during an election tends to substitute visible vulnerabilities of 
a lesser magnitude by invisible and widespread vulnerabilities. 
Key-words : Internet voting, remote voting, postal remote voting, hybrid remote voting, democracy, 
transparency, fraud, anonymity, authenticity, unicity, visibility, virus, worms.
Introduction
Remote voting procedures have been renewed recently with the introduction of optical scanners to 
automatically read the ballots or to completely dematerialise the objects used to vote by an internet 
voting process. This article studies three methods of remote voting (postal voting, hybrid voting and 
Internet voting). It describes the various phases. Technical vulnerabilities of internet voting are set 
out in part three, while the fourth part compares the vulnerabilities of each type of vote. 
I. Remote voting
I.1 - Definition
Depending on the country, remote voting may consist of two separate concepts: 
— Voting is supervised but takes place outside the normal location (e.g in an embassy); 
— Voting takes place in an uncontrolled environment and in the absence of any electoral officer. 
We are interested here in remote voting outside the control of an electoral officer in the following 
three forms: Internet voting, postal voting and hybrid voting. 
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The scope of a study of the elections may include the preparation of voter lists,  the candidates' 
campaign up until the announcement of results. We focus here only on the ballots that we observe 
from their delivery to the voters until the counting of votes.
We do not present questions relating to paper voting procedure that have already been studied (see 
[7] and [15]), or aspects of the digital divide and accessibility (see [3], [14]).
I.2 - Three ways to vote remotely in an uncontrolled environment 
For each mode of remote voting, we define a model represented by a real application widely used 
and which we consider as representative of the practices. 
— Internet voting: Internet voting procedure used in the canton of Geneva in 2007 [10]. 
— Postal voting: as used in the canton of Geneva in 2007 [31]. 
— Hybrid  voting:  hybrid  voting  procedure  used  in  the  elections  of  the  Comité  National  de  la 
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in France in 2008.
Internet voting
Internet voting (i-voting) is part of a broader package called electronic voting (e-voting). Under the 
latter are grouped all forms of voting involving an electronic device to cast or count votes.
There are drafts of standards and international norms but they lack precision in their definition of 
the necessary organizational, legal and technological models. There are, therefore, many different 
Internet voting procedures. However, it is possible to expose a general pattern that is more or less 
respected by the usual procedures of Internet voting that are said to be secure. Information relevant 
to authentication are provided to voters by mail. Voters log on an official web site to vote from any 
computer connected to the Internet and equipped with a browser compatible with the application 
running on the official web site. Each voter uses the information that she had previously received to 
be identified (login and password), and then she express her choice. It is encrypted and sent to the 
server hosting the official web site that collects the votes, stores them until the close of the poll and 
produces the results of the vote at the close of the poll. 
Because all the voters do not have a computer with an Internet connection, this method of voting is 
always an addition to a postal voting procedure1.
Postal voting 
Each voter receives the material for voting by mail. It includes a "voting card"2 bearing the identity 
of the voter, the correspondence envelope and an anonymous envelope. To vote, the voter puts the 
ballot of his choice in the anonymous envelope that she seals. Then she slips this envelope and the 
voting  card  that  she  dates  and  signs  into  the  correspondence  envelope.  This  correspondence 
envelope is then sent by post to the election office. 
The election office collects the envelopes as they are received. The counting takes place in two 
phases.  First,  the  names  of  the  voters  are  ticked  off  on  the  signature  register.  Then,  the 
correspondence envelopes are opened to collect the anonymous envelopes that are randomised to 
break any link between them and the envelopes of correspondence. Finally they are opened, ballots 
are extracted and votes are counted in order to determine the outcome of the vote.
1 With the notable exception of France where the decree n° 2007-554 of the 13th of April 2007 on detailed rules for the electronic  
election on the order of nurses precises that "Electronic voting precludes any other method of voting." 
2 The term "voting card" is polysemic. Here it is a paper card bearing the name and the address of the voter.
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Hybrid voting
The hybrid voting procedure is a modification of the postal voting procedure to allow for automated 
counting. Voters receive electoral materials by mail: a "voting card" and a single envelope. Each 
card carries a voting mark (barcode and/or number) to identify the voter and a series of boxes placed 
in front of the proposed alternatives. The voter blackens the boxes of her choice to vote. 
The election office collects the envelopes as they are received. The counting is automatized: voting 
cards are extracted from the envelopes and then scanned. A computer updates the signatures registry 
to be marked and the number of votes obtained by each candidate. 
figure 1 : Voting card for hybrid voting
I.3 - Phases of remote voting in an uncontrolled environment 
Remote  voting  in  an  uncontrolled  environment  follows  a  path  that  can  be  split  into  several 
abstracted  phases  that  are  common  to  the  three  methods  of  voting  we  are  observing,  but 
implemented differently depending on the voting method (see table 1): the organizers of the vote 
prepare electoral material (B1), and its transmission (B2). The electoral material travels through the 
transmission channel (C1) and is received by the voter (E1). Voters express their choice (E2) and 
then prepare to send their vote (E3). The ballot is transmitted (C2). The polling station receives 
ballots (B3) and then performs the necessary counts (B4). 
This  presentation  does  not  include  all  communications,  for  example,  Internet  voting  involves 
several communications between the voter and the voting system during the vote decision phase 
(E2). 
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Internet voting Postal voting Hybride voting
B1* Preparation  of 
electoral material
Drawing  up  lists  of  identifiers 
and passwords
Printing of electoral material Printing of electoral material
B2* Preparation for the 
dispatch of electoral 
material
Fold up and transfer to the post office
C1* Transmission of 
electoral material
Login and password are sent by 
post
The two envelopes and the 
ballots are sent by post
The envelope and the voting 
card are sent by post
E1 Receipt of electoral 
material
The electoral material is received by the elector
E2 Expression of choice The voter connects to the 
electoral web site, registers, 
authenticates, makes her choice 
and confirms
The voter express her choice 
through the ballot paper
The voter express her choice 
through the voting card
E3 Preparation for 
sending
The virtual ballot is encrypted The voter puts her ballot paper 
in the anonymous envelope, 
and then in the correspondence 
envelope
The voter puts her voting card 
in the enveloppe
C2 Transmission of the 
ballot
The ballot travels to the officiel 
servor through Internet
The post transport the enveloppes containing ballots to the 
polling office
B3 Reception The official web site stores the 
received envelopes, updates the 
signatures list and return receipts 
to voters
The polling station receives and stores the envelopes containing 
ballots
B4 Counts The software decrypts and count 
the votes
The signature register is 
updated, the anonymous 
envelopes are opened and the 
votes are counted
The envelopes are opened, the 
scanner reads the ballot, the 
software updates the signature 
register and counts the votes
* This step can be non-existent when voters connect with a connection card with a magnetic stripe, as in Estonia.
figure 2 : Phases of remote voting in an uncontrolled environment 
II. Methodological choices 
II.1 - Comparative Approach
All  voting  systems  have  vulnerabilities,  there  is  no  perfect  voting  system  that  ensures  strict 
compliance with the principles of democratic elections and gives entirely fair results. Our analysis 
will compare three models of remote voting according to criteria expressed by various international 
organizations:  the Universal  Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21) [23],  the  Code of Good 
Pratice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission [8], the Election Observation Handbook of 
the  Organization  for  Security and Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE)  [27].  These  criteria  may be 
characteristic of any democratic vote or be specific to the remote vote [9]. 
We quantify the consequences  of  major  weaknesses  through three parameters:  vote  magnitude, 
visibility and difficulty. 
— The  vote  magnitude  depends  on  the  number  of  votes  potentially  affected  by  a  fraud  or  a 
malfunction.  This parameter may be small  (a few votes), average (number of votes sufficient to 
change the outcome of elections) or large (potentially nearly all votes). 
— The difficulty is a fuzzy estimation of the likelihood of the occurrence of conditions required to 
exploit a vulnerability. In the case of a problem of technical reliability, it estimates if the failure is 
common or rare. For a fraud, it measures the complexity of its successful implementation (number 
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of  people  involved,  technical  knowledge,  cost,  discretion,  etc.)..  This  parameter  can  take  three 
values ; small, medium and large. 
— The visibility is used to measure whether the consequences of a vulnerability are evident or not. 
It can take three values: zero (consequences are invisible), medium (consequences are visible but 
can not be proved to a court) or large (consequences are sufficiently visible to render the election 
null and void). 
The worst case scenario occurs when the vote magnitude is large, visibility is zero and the difficulty 
small. These three criteria are not independent: difficulty and visibility will be estimated for a large 
or medium magnitude. 
II.2 – Democratic remote voting
Democratic Elections 
Remote voting is part of the governance processes on which democracies are based on. The criteria 
set  out  by  international  agencies  seek  compliance  with  the  essential  qualities  of  democratic 
elections: 
— Unicity: the 'one elector, one vote' principle3;
— Confidentiality: each voter expresses her choice alone; 
— Anonymity: it is impossible to link a ballot to the voter who cast it4; 
— Sincerity: the results of the election reflect faithfully the will of the voters; 
— Transparency:  "the  system’s  transparency must  be  guaranteed  in  the  sense  that  it  must  be 
possible to check that it is functioning properly." (Venice Commission) [9]. 
Remote voting
These generic criteria are supplemented by specific criteria to remote voting: 
— Safety: the system can withstand prospective attacks; 
— Reliability: the system works, in spite of hardware or software deficiencies. 
The main difficulty is to ensure that votes are not distorted or lost between the casting of the votes 
by the voters and the counting of the ballots.
III - Technical vulnerabilities of Internet voting
Voting by Internet is a new procedure characterized by the dematerialisation of all objects relating 
to the voting procedure (ballots, ballot box, signing sheet). We describe some technical flaws that 
may change and distort the virtual entities which represent these objects. These vulnerabilities can 
concern safety or reliability.
3 It is the uniqueness that makes an election being universal. Every person of voting age (and not deprived of his civil rights) can  
vote once. There are no other criteria limiting the right to vote as it was in France with the "censitaire" (a minimum income was 
required) or the denial of voting rights to women, still current in some countries.
4 Confidentiality and anonymity are two aspects of the secrecy of the vote. 
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III.1 - Safety 
Worms5 and viruses
The computer  used by the voter is  likely to  host  worms and viruses that  can trigger attacks to 
modify the choice expressed by the voter.  Most antivirus softwares can only detect  worms and 
viruses that are already known, new viruses can not be identified before proceeding. In addition, the 
attackers  have  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  test  their  creations  using  the  same  commonly 
distributed anti-virus software that is used by their potential victims. The latest viruses are able to 
pass firewalls and other defences, and are difficult to detect [22] [30]. Attackers can create new 
viruses,  or  viruses  that  modify existing  ones  (kits  exist  on  the  internet  for  the  construction  of 
viruses). A virus can easily infect a large number of computers without being detected and remain 
dormant until voting day. Viruses could carry out many undesirable operations, unbeknownst to the 
voter,  such  as  capturing  the  server  connection  details,  changing the  vote  of  the  elector  before 
encryption, spying on the vote of the electors and disclosing all these details to a third party. 
Pharming
The voter is a victim of misuse of session when she typed in the address URL6 the official web site 
address site and she navigates using the protocol for securing communications SSL7. She believed 
she votes on the official web site when in fact she is interacting with a web site that imitates the 
official web site including by sending a confirmation of receipt of the vote. 
The theft can be unmasked if the voter verifies that the security certificate is known and valid. But a 
falsified  safety  certificate  may  have  been  accepted  on  the  same  computer  during  a  previous 
connection to a web site thought to be secure, causing the display of a warning (see Figure 3). In this 
case, many users choose to continue, without being aware that they allow a potentially falsified 
safety certificate to join safety certificates that have been duly approved by certification authorities. 
Thus, when connecting to the fake voting web site, there will be no security alert. 
figure 3 : Window Security Alert 
Man-in-the-middle
A man-in-the-middle attack consists  of impersonating the server from the point  of view of the 
voter's computer, and impersonating the voter's computer from the point of view of the server. The 
fraudster can change the cast vote. Encryption voting offers good protection against this attack if the 
5 A worm is a virus that has the ability to spread alone by using the network. 
6 URL : Uniform Ressource Locator.
7 SSL : Secured Socket Layer.
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public key encryption that has been sent to the voter has not been intercepted by the fraudster. It is 
thus  necessary to  send  this  key  via  a  secure  mail.  However  it  is  not  necessary to  know  the 
encryption key to capture and destroy ballots and to return confirmation messages to the voters to 
make them believe that their votes had been registered. Voters are deprived from exercising their 
right to vote without knowing it unless they check the the signatures registry. 
Denial of service
Denial of service is when a vote server is bombarded with connections to prevent legitimate voters 
from voting. The server, saturated with requests, can not respond to all the demands for connections 
and is likely to crash. 
III.2 - Reliability 
1a - Hardware errors 
A computer may experience failures or malfunctions. There may be defects in equipment, including 
electronic cards (faulty welds), or even in microprocessors. Computers must therefore incorporate 
mechanisms for error detection, which is not routinely done on personal computers. 
1b - Software errors
There may be errors in programs that  run on a computer.  These errors can occur at  all  levels: 
operating  system,  softwares,  compilers,  security  vulnerabilities,  etc.  That  is  why the  National 
Institute  of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends that the control of the results  of an 
electronic voting system should not be processed by a software application that, too, may experience 
malfunctions [24]. These results were confirmed by numerous academic studies on dematerialised 
voting  [12]  [18]  [21]  [33],  the  Irish  independent  commission  on  electronic  voting  [4]  [5]  or 
international institutions [26] . 
Several ways were explored to detect and eliminate errors in Internet voting: testing, development 
of formal programs, expertise, monitoring of elections and verification of cryptographic results. 
Tests
Successfully  testing  an  application  can  not  predict  with  certainty  the  behaviour  of  the  same 
application  in  future  uses,  or  even its  performance  during past  operation.  It  is  not  possible  to 
simulate  or reproduce the course of  a  real  election  involving thousands of  people,  with  all  the 
hazards that may occur. The process of testing is inadequate to prove the correctness of a computer 
program. It is, therefore, not suitable for an electronic voting application where malfunctions may 
go unnoticed because of the anonymity inherent in the system.
Formal development 
In science terms, to be certain that a program has no errors, it should at least be required to use 
formal  development  methods.  These  methods  are  very  expensive  and  limited  to  software 
components. Beyond a certain level of complexity, there are still no sure development methods8. 
Control expert
There may be certification authorities but they lack the ability to verify programs with sufficient 
resources and attention to detect  all  errors and security vulnerabilities.  Finally,  even if  such an 
8 « We don't  have  a  theory that  can  guarantee  system reliability,  that  can  tell  us  how to  build  systems  that  are  correct  by 
construction. We only have some recipes about how to write good programs and how to design good hardware. We're learning by 
a trial-and-error-process » J. Sifakis [32].
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examination was made, even if we had development methods to avoid human error, there would 
remain an unsolved problem, namely to ensure that the programs in use are exactly those have been 
certified  or  to  ensure  that  these  programs  run  without  modification  forced by the  environment 
(execution  modified  by a  malicious  piece  of  code  introduced  by some  peripheral  software  or 
device). In all cases, the server uses an operating system, possibly a compiler or a code interpreter, 
that  should  also  be  considered,  etc.  This  approach  quickly  becomes  daunting  and  therefore 
impraticable9. 
Monitoring of elections
To trace the operation of a computer application, its progress must be observed step by step. But, 
introducing  probes  into  software  programs  to  monitor  their  performance  raises  the  issue  of 
objectivity and neutrality of these probes and of the programs that analyse observed data. As part of 
a voting system, such monitoring involves keeping a logbook in which all events are recorded and 
time-stamped: arrival of a ballot,  signing the signing registry, counting, etc. The problem is that 
reading this logbook would allow everyone's vote to be determined, which constitutes a violation of 
the voting secrecy. If the information in the logbook is not complete (to protect the secrecy of the 
vote), the process becomes useless as it  is no longer possible to fully monitor the processing of 
information  received  and  to  detect  malfunctioning  (or  fraud).  We  note  here  that  an  effective 
measure in the context  of the usual uses of the Internet (such as bank transactions) can not be 
successfully implemented because of the very special features of anonymous democratic elections. 
Verification of the results a posteriori
Voting by Internet is the subject of intense research in the field of cryptography to provide models 
allowing any voter to verify that his vote is taken into account and that the total of all votes is 
correct.  The elector  must  also be able  to  provide evidence for  its  findings.  Some experimental 
systems have been implemented as RIES [16] or VoteBox [29]. These systems exhibit a high degree 
of complexity, which is a factor of vulnerability: a well-designed cryptographic protocol may make 
errors of settlements and be vulnerable to fraud [17], [28]. Moreover, with these systems, even if a 
voter sees is a distortion of her vote she can not prove it. In addition, to respect the confidentiality it 
is indispensable to destroy the intermediate files10. 
IV. Evaluation 
Different approaches are possible to structure this evaluation because the analysis must take into 
account several dimensions: compliance with the criteria that characterize a democratic election, 
technical characteristics of each mode of voting, or the spatio-temporal sequence of attacks on an 
election. We will follow this last thread by first addressing issues common to the three methods of 
voting and then treating them individually. 
IV.1 Common issues
Preparation, dispatch and transmission of the electoral material
An incident or a misconduct can lead to a failure in printing (B1) or transmitting (B2) the electoral 
material to a portion of the electorate. Postal mail containing electoral material can be lost, delayed 
or diverted during transmission (C1). The voters are thus deprived of their right to vote. 
9 « les experts ne contrôlent que ce qu’ils veulent, ou ce qu’ils peuvent. » (Experts only control what they want, or what they are 
capable to) A. Auer [2]
10 It is difficult to destroy files in order to make impossible their reconstruction.
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These interferences with the principles of unicity and authenticity may be of average magnitude, its 
difficulty is small for a person involved in the organization. It presents medium visibility because 
the letters were not sent by registered post for reasons of cost, there is no control of their issue and 
inattentive voters are unlikely to notice this non-delivery and to report it officially. A strict control 
of the number of letters actually sent is essential. 
Receipt of electoral material (E1)
When a postal mail is received, it can be intercepted by one of the many people sharing the same 
home. This fraud may be committed by a person close to the voter. This person is likely to know the 
additional information required to be allowed to vote (usually the date of birth). This fraud has a 
small magnitude: a fraudster may only divert a few votes. 
The biometric processes are often considered to prevent identification fraud for Internet voting. This 
approach meets different obstacles. First, it contradicts several security principles such as the fact 
that  a  password  should  always  be  stored  in  a  single  file  and  encrypted,  could  be  changed  if 
necessary  and  that  the  stages  of  identification  and  authentication  should  be  separate.  When 
biometric  procedures  are  implemented,  we  observe  that  the  same  data  is  used  to  identify  and 
authenticate. This data is not secret and it is impossible to change. In addition, it has been repeatedly 
demonstrated that it  is easy to fool biometric systems [20]11.  Finally, generalizing this  approach 
involves  identifying  and  centralizing  the  biometric  data  of  all  voters,  which  poses  technical, 
organizational and ethical problems. 
Non receipt of electoral material (E1)
The envelopes carrying the electoral material that did not reach their addressee are returned to the 
sender, ie the polling station. It may be tempting to use them to vote. 
The magnitude of this fraud is limited by the number of envelopes returned to the polling station. It 
is important that these envelopes are counted and that number is noted in the official minutes as a 
measure to identify a large scale diversion of electoral material.
Expression of choice (E2)
Respecting confidentiality means that  voters vote  alone and without  any coercion.  None of the 
remote voting modes in an uncontrolled environment that we examine is able to guarantee that the 
elector expresses his choice alone and free from coercion. 
Research to address the problems of coercion and thus to increase the respect for confidentiality 
were implemented in some systems by Internet voting: they offer the possibility of voting several 
times, the last vote being the one to be finally counted12. In addition, voters may vote directly at a 
polling station (in a controlled environment) during a few days before the official election day and 
cancelling their eventual vote by internet. Such attempts have the disadvantage of weakening the 
principle of anonymity: to enable the possibility of cancellation, votes must be stored on the server 
maintaining the link between the votes and the identifiers of the persons who sent them. Introducing 
the possibility of multiple voting eliminates coercion, a visible weakness (at least by the elector 
concerned)  of  small  magnitude,  but  introduces  a  hidden  vulnerability  of  large  magnitude:  the 
collection and analysis of the internal files to the server can reveal the identity of all voters and the 
11 In France, these weaknesses had lead the service in charge with the state protection and security (Secrétariat Général de la 
Défense Nationale - SGDN) to advise against the use a biometrics for the security of the computer systems of the state[36].
12 Curiously, some studies suggest to give the voter the opportunity to mark a vote as final, although this possibility would destroy 
the benefits of multiple voting because, in case of coercion, the victim will obviously being forced to mark her forced vote as 
final.[35].
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choices they have made. 
IV.2 Postal voting
The weak point of the postal voting is the transmission of ballots (C2). The envelopes containing 
the ballots can be diverted (they are easily recognizable), or simply may not arrive in time to be 
used.  Although postal  services  are  expected  to  respect  the  secrecy of  letters,  envelopes  can be 
opened  and  the  votes  disclosed  in  violation  of  the  principle  of  confidentiality.  There  are  also 
techniques to determine the contents of envelopes without opening them. It would be theoretically 
possible to use a registered delivery service and use only secure envelopes, but the enormous cost of 
such measures would make it unrealistic to apply them at large and there are countries where the 
concept of secure postal services does not exist13. 
Envelopes may be destroyed or replaced after receipt at the central polling station (B3). 
These attacks  on the authenticity and confidentiality principles  have a medium visibility which 
increases with the number of letters. The difficulty of implementation also depends on the scale: it 
is easy to remove one or two envelopes, repeating the operation for several hundreds or thousands 
requires the involvement of many people which increases its visibility. In France, postal voting has 
been banned for political elections by the Law No. 75-1329 of 31 December 1975 [19] after many 
cases of proven fraud. 
IV.3 Hybrid voting
Hybrid voting has the same vulnerabilities as postal voting regarding the transmission of ballots 
(C2). Similarly, envelopes containing voting card can be stolen and destroyed after receipt (B3). 
Replacing envelopes containing voting cards is more complex than for postal voting because each 
voting card is unique. The magnitude of this fraud is thus limited if the voting card manufacturing is 
beyond the reach of the central polling station. 
The counting stage (B4) is automated. Voting cards that bear the identifier and choice of each voter 
are scanned by a single application that manages both the updating of signing sheet and the counting 
of the votes. The separation between votes, identifiers and identities of voters is not clear. People 
with access to software that performs the counting have the possibility of disclosing the identities 
and choices of voters. This infringement to the vote secrecy may be done by a single person and 
could affect all the votes, while remaining undetected.
IV.4 Internet voting
Preparation and transmission of electoral material 
With Internet voting, there is no ballot paper and no voting card. A piece of information in enough 
to vote. 
Electronic forms that contains identifiers and passwords may be copied after their generation, or at 
the office which prints the electoral material (B1). This operation may involve the entire electorate 
and not does not present great difficulties, while remaining invisible. However, to strengthen the 
security, information such as the date or the town of birth, are often required. The collection of this 
information for many people may be an insurmountable task, which limits the size of this attack.
To remove this step, and therefore the vulnerabilities that accompany it, it is possible to equip each 
13 Case of abroad voters. 
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voter with an electronic card used as an identifier. In this case one risk replaces another: the use of a 
single  identity  card14 to  perform  different  actions  (voting,  paying  taxes,  etc..)  makes  people 
particularly vulnerable to abusive actions of the state that might be tempted to make use of such data 
for undesirable purposes. This risk should not be overlooked, especially as any state that would be 
tempted by such practices would almost certainly not be the most willing to inform the population 
of the dangers[11]. 
Between the expression of choice (E2) and the reception of votes (B3)
These steps give rise to interactions between the voter and the server of the official vote web site. 
A virus present on the voter computer can intercept the vote between its validation (E2) and its 
encryption (E3) and communicate  it  to others.  It can also implement  a diversion (pharming) to 
capture the session information entered by the voter. This information can then be used to vote at 
the place of the legitimate voter. These viral actions might affect a large number of votes and stay 
almost  invisible.  Their  achievement  does  not  display  any particular  difficulty  for  a  motivated 
hacker. 
Denial of service, that disrupts access to the official web site, is immediately visible. 
Many people might be tempted to vote from a computer in their workplace, especially if it  is a 
professional  election,  without  ever  realizing  that  companies  exercise  control  on  the  use  of  the 
internet [6] and therefore might be able to spy on their employees' votes. 
Reception (B3) et counts (B4)
During its transmission via the Internet, information about the identity of the voter and information 
about the choice made by the voter stay together and arrive together on the offical web site server. 
This point is particularly sensitive and has been the subject of numerous publications showing how 
to encrypt the votes in order to decode the identity of the voter independently of her choice ([13] for 
example).  But  it  is  still  possible  to  reconstruct  the  votes  from  intermediate  files  storing  the 
information received by the server, even if they are encrypted (having enough data and time to study 
facilitate this type of fraud). There is no technical measures which would make impossible to breach 
the secrecy of voting by a person with malicious intent and with access to the servers. 
There are conventional process of fraud such as the introduction of a Trojan Horse or a Back Door. 
These frauds  are  summarized  in  the introduction  of  a  few lines  of  program that  can easily go 
unnoticed in the middle of programs including several thousands of lines [34]. These malpractices 
can be implemented  by a  single  person.  It may be a  programmer,  a technician  responsible  for 
maintenance  and  updates,  or  any person  with  a  physical  or  logical  access  to  the  servers.  The 
magnitude of such fraud is large. 
Finally,  the  combination  of  automate  updating of  signing registers  and the dematerialisation  of 
ballots  facilitate  ballot  stuffing  on  a  large  scale:  at  the  final  moments  of  the  voting  period  a 
fraudulent  program can  generate  many votes  from voters  who  abstained.  This  risk  can  not  be 
controlled by monitoring the rate of participation because it was observed that the voting sites are 
experiencing peak attendance in the last moments during which the vote is  open. It can not be 
stopped by checking the voters: even if voters discover that a vote has been registered in their name 
when they did not vote, it will be impossible to prove. 
14 Effective in Estonia.
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V. Assessment 
V.1 - Synthesis
None  of  the  remote  voting  systems  can  be  classified  as  safe.  But  the  consequences  of  the 
vulnerabilities are heterogeneous. 
Postal voting 
Postal voting is vulnerable to fraud and heavily dependant on postal services, but attacks on the 
fairness of elections can not go unnoticed when they are large. 
Hybrid voting
Hybrid voting delegates the counting of votes and the updating of the signing registry to automatic 
procedures and disallows any outside intervention in this crucial stage of an election. The procedure 
for counting may hide malfunctions or major frauds that keep intact the total number of counted 
votes but undermines its sincerity. The establishment of such a fraud would require that all received 
voting  cards  were  counted  again  by physical  persons,  which  is  impossible  if  there  are  several 
thousands of ballots because of practical difficulties (you must keep the ballots sealed, find enough 
people to make counts, above all, be able to justify the need for such an operation) and legal (if the 
recount is not completed, there is no evidence to present to the election judge qualified to allow the 
recount). 
In addition, the software may disclose to third parties how each voter voted and this violation of the 
secrecy of vote may be difficult to prove. 
This procedure has implicit vulnerabilities of large magnitude that could stay invisible and present a 
small difficulty. 
Internet voting
Internet  voting  presents  vulnerabilities  of  the  worst  kind:  they are  invisible,  can  affect  a  large 
number of votes, may be committed by a small number of people (from anywhere in the world) and 
do not  require  expensive  equipment.  These vulnerabilities  are present  at  different  stages  of the 
voting process: at the voter's computer, during the delivery of votes or when the count is processed.
V.2 - Analysis
Remote voting vulnerabilities that we examined can take place at different stages of the vote and 
remain  undetected  by officials,  delegates  and  candidates'  representatives.  These  stages  can  be 
corrupted without anyone knowing. 
With  the postal  voting the areas of  opacity are limited  to  the choice by the elector  and to  the 
transmission of letters. The automatic vote counting in hybrid voting procedures extends the areas 
of opacity by preventing the public counting of the votes. 
Internet voting radicalises the automation process by handling dematerialised objects. The voting 
process is displaced from the real world to a virtual world where the observations made directly 
through our perceptions (sight,  touch,  etc..)  do not  apply and which is  outside the reach of the 
majority of citizens. It is impossible to directly control the voting process and evaluate how it works 
correctly. It is only possible to observe processes that are supposed to reflect the activity of the 
voting system, but which can also give a distorted view. 
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The votes can be affected by events that may remain invisible: criminal acts (even easier to commit 
when near of the team responsible for organizing the elections) or simple malfunctions. 
Lastly it appears that science is powerless against this problem. Writing a large program that hides 
errors  can  be  considered  as  a  great  achievement.  However,  ensuring  that  no  program  hosts 
deliberate  "errors" willfully is  a far  more complex  task.  Neither tests15 nor the expertise  of the 
programs are sufficient, as recalls Ken Thompson, co-designer of the UNIX system. 
« You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that 
employ people like me.)  No amount  of  source-level verification or scrutiny will  protect  you from 
using untrusted code. (...) As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to 
detect. A well installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to detect. »[34]
Conclusion
This study presented technical and democratic vulnerabilities of three ways of remote voting. It 
showed that the use of computerized tools lead, by nature to more complex procedures, making 
potentially invisible some massive attacks against authenticity or confidentiality. 
It  appears  that  the  dematerialisation  and  the  transformation  of  information  that  lie  in  any 
computerized processing put the voting process in a new world where the ordinary rules of physics 
no longer apply. The impossible becomes possible (thousands of votes may be altered in a moment) 
and  the  apparent  banality  of  electronic  voting  systems  can  become  a  deceptive  illusion.  For 
example, in the real world the simple mixing of the anonymous envelopes breaks definitively the 
relationship between votes and voters. In the virtual universe, there is still no way to do this: files 
can be copied, information can be recovered after being erased, etc.
In France, the Commission Nationale Informatique et Liberté (CNIL) requires separate management 
of votes and identities but seems unaware that this separation is not likely to prohibit violations of 
the secrecy of the vote. Similarly, the European Commission defines transparency as the ability to 
verify that the voting system is functioning properly, which remains an impossible task as we have 
previously demonstrated. It recommends that the voter can confirm his vote and correct it16 while 
this  operation  requires  that  a  link  between  voter  and  vote  be  maintained,  thus  weakening  the 
principle  of  anonymity.  These  attempts  to  reconcile  anonymity,  protection  of  authenticity  and 
dematerialisation show that the transition to electronic elections conceals fundamental problems and 
reveals the contradictions and unexpected difficulties. 
« The clear consensus of computer-science experts around the world who have studied these 
issues is that Internet elections cannot be trusted, for all the reasons that I have explained: the 
voters and political parties cannot audit the operation of the software and hardware that serves 
as the real bureau de vote. Therefore it is not clear to me how the assesseurs can sign anything 
but a surrealist image of a true procès-verbal. » [1]
15 « Il existe en outre un théorème fondamental de la théorie de l'informatique selon lequel il ne peut y avoir de test 
général pour décider si un système et ses logiciels hébergent ou non un code malveillant. » (There is a foundamental 
information theory theorem that establishes there is no test which allows to know if a system and its softwares host, 
or do not host, a malware.) R. Oppliger [25]
16 « Furthermore, the elector must be able to obtain confirmation of his or her vote and, if necessary, correct it without the secrecy 
of the ballot being in any way violated. » [9]
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